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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN WRITING A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

Terrell Carver
University of Bristol
In this article I would like to raise a number of methodological
issues relevant to political biography, and to respond with views
developed from my own experience in writing a life of Friedrich
Engels (1820-95). 1
While not a statesman, Engels was a participant in political action, and he was active in politics as a writer. He was part
of the most influential intellectual partnership of all time, and he
was phenomenally successful in his own right as a political
pamphleteer. Additionally some of his ideas were of a theoretical
character and survived him in "classic" works. Indeed, posthumous readings of them have eclipsed his actual activities in
politics as a speech-maker and organizer, as well as his contemporary influence on others through conversation, correspondence, journalism and books. In effect he had, and still has, a
function in twentieth-century politics and beyond, in so far as in
contemporary eyes he is a figure of authority, or alternatively a
scapegoat.
Now that the edifice of Marxism-Leninism has almost
entirely crumbled, Engels's life, career and ideas are open to a
fresh reading, as there is little urgency at present to associate him
with, or disassociate him from, the historical events between the
Russian Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall. My biography
details a politics of revolutionary consritutionalism of the 1830s
and 1840s which Engels supported and which has been revived,
in effect, in the recent mass uprisings. Previously underplayed
aspects of his thought are now clearly exposed, and contemporary
events can be approached with a richer understanding of their
antecedents.
As implied in the title I shall focus on methodological
issues and keep my subject in the background. However, methodological discussions ought to refer to actual projects, and I hope
that my report is illustrative and potentially generalizable.
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BIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE
Biography is of course historical narrative, and in recent years the
author-narrative-subject-reader-audience nexus has been questioned or "deconstructed ." Subjects, such as biographical ones,
are said to be ultimately inaccessible, in that their inner motives
could never have been projected into some external "evidence,"
accessible to a biographer , without remainder or distortion .
Meaning is said to lie solely in narrative, not in any "matching"
between concept and object. Different meanings are said to arise
in different readers, as they put their own constructions on
narratives. The author is therefore said to be dead. 2
Or, rather, there is now enormous suspicion of authors.
They are no longer regarded even in principle as reliable media
through which "facts" about subjects can reach readers. Authors'
assumptions and judgments are under scrutiny; they are pres urned
to be the subtext or hidden agenda of narratives; texts are said to
incorporate "absences" as well as "presences." 3 Scholarly biographies, heavy with footnotes and learning, are no exception.
Narrative is crucial to understanding; neither texts nor
lives are "strings of propositions." Texts are related to arguments
and lives to motives, as Quentin Skinner has argued. 4 Both lives
and texts must be considered much more carefully now that the
age of philosophical innocence for political biographers is over.
In my own narrative I confronted the reader with myself
as biographer by intruding into the biography and listing questions that I propose to answer. I give guiding questions for the
work as a whole, so that the reader will know why I undertook it;
and I give more specific questions for each chapter (or sometimes
pair of chapters) . I recognize that readers should not be burdened
with unwanted autobiography, but it is fair to identify oneself to
an audience as having some things in mind quite specifically and
not others. The reader should be aware that the biography emerges
from a biographer with intentions , and not from some god-like
consciousness that is omniscient and omnipresent.
I think it likely that readers find it restful to assume that
biographers are all-knowing, because they have burrowed into
every archive, and all-wise , because they have selected just what
is necessary to make the narrative go. Biographers and readers
have both found it easy to pretend that the biographer is a "time
lord," opening a "time tunnel" down which readers can peer in
utter transparency and thus recapture the past as it was . In a sense
there has been a conspiracy of trust between biographer and
audience. This, in my view, should be replaced by mutual
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suspicion, otherwise a mutual tendency to intellectual laziness
takes over.
THE NARRATIVE FRAME
Biographies are traditionally but only seemingly framed by the
birth and death of the subject. Generally the "life" as presented in
a biographical narrative is preceded by " brief lives" of forebears
and identification of "influences," whether persons or ideas or
books. This may extend to essays on the "spirit of the times" or
cultural tradition or whatever. All these devices serve to determine the subject's consciousness and to discount the subject's
own will. To counter this common way of conceptualizing the
subject I deliberately alluded to the careers of others in the Engels
family who were the "products" of virtually identical "influences," but were never remotely like Friedrich in terms of what
they attempted and accomplished or even thought, so far as is
known .
Indeed "what is known" became a major theme in my
work, in that I also reminded the reader that history, including
biography, is an archaeological exercise. Only certain kinds of
materials, and only certain exemplars at that, happen to have
survived to the present. Thus one has to be extremely careful in
drawing definitive conclusions about the subject on the basis of
whatever materials happen to have been preserved .
I drew the conclusion concerning some matters in the
biography that surviving materials allow us merely to note an
ambiguity or unsolved problem; and concerning other issues I
deliberately drew a variety of contrasting conclusions, since it
seemed to me that several plausible narratives were compatible
with the "evidence." I also speculated on the nature and content
of materials, indeed immaterial things like conversations, that did
not, or could not, have survived as they happened at the time.
Obviously the reader has to be warned that these are speculations,
and it is extremely important in my approach that such "absences"
should be flagged for attention. By working from what is known
to what is unknown, however, some speculations can be promoted
as more plausible than others. I mention this particularly because
such "black-hole" categories as " unrecorded conversations" have
been used in Marx-Engels studies to fill out hypotheses in ways
that conform more closely to the biographer's views than to the
materials that have survived. 5
The death of the subject comes traditionally at the close of
the biography, though not at the absolute end, as the biographical
"frame" generally includes the subject's posthumous influence.
5

During their own lifetimes biographical subjects are events in
other people's lives, and they continue in that role after their
deaths. Their works are sometimes published long after their
deaths, and they become objects of interpretation.
Engels is particularly interesting in this respect as he
established an interpretive context around himself ("Marx's junior partner") and around Marx (the "materialist philosopher who
inverted Hegel," the "Darwin of the social sciences," the "revolutionary fighter" for communism). Moreover, as much as Engels' s
biographers determined his consciousness through traditional
narrative methods, so in tum did he determine the consciousness
of his biographers. He did this by establishing a narrative about
himself in relation to Marx; about Marx in relation to politics; and
about his own, his and Marx's, and Marx's own works in relation
to philosophy and science.
NARRATIVE TIME
Narrative time in biography often moves in ways of which the
biographer is perhaps not conscious, or at least not too willing to
inform the reader. Narrative time is really space on the printed
page, as biographers dwell longer (in terms of words to be read)
on some topics than on others. A number of different considerations may dictate the structure of the recovered "life" in this sense.
One is simply the amount of material to which the biographer has access; for example there may be enormous amounts of
"late" correspondence , but little juvenilia. Another is the way that
the biographer periodizes the "life." This of course reflects the
overall view that the biographer takes of the subject's "career,"
and that naturally reflects what the biographer thinks is important
about the subject. What was actually important to the subject in
attempting to determine his/her life tends to fade out here, and the
importance of the subject, or the subject's writings, or the idea of
the subject, as these appear in the lives of others, tends to take
center stage in the narrative.
The "importance" of the subject in "history" (as lived out
by other people) thus becomes the subject's "narrative life" within
the biographical "frame," and I have striven not to allow that in my
work. Panly this is because Engels' s reputation and influence are
very well documented elsewhere; partly because I did not want
events or activities as they occurred in his life to assume an
anachronistic importance; and partly because I wished to experiment with a biography that was rooted in life as lived by the
subject in order to create a contrast with traditional narrative
which was frankly mythological.
6

Why the biographer thinks some things are important
about the subject and not others is often not explicitly revealed.
Some biographers may regard what is important about the subject
as already fixed, and new biographies merely add to "facts"
already known an interpretation that may feebly be described as
"fresh." But the subject remains a great politician or poet or writer
or whatever,just as we originally thought. In that way biographers
reproduce interpretive traditions, and those traditions dictate what
amongst the subject's remains is "public" and supposedly lasting,
and what is "private" and presumably trivial. An interpretive
tradition thus acts to determine the subject's consciousness and
the reader's perceptions; Engels could never have wanted to be an
artist, for example, or make a career in the theatre (though we have
his early sketchbooks and a libretto). Indeed we do not know what
his career plans were in his early youth; perhaps he did not know
either. Biographers generally race through juvenilia at blinding
speed, unless it happens to foreshadow later activities which
"posterity" has judged important.
"Posterity" plays a large role in dictating narrative space,
in that books or manuscripts which were of little importance to
anyone, perhaps even the subject at the time, sometimes become
important events in the narrative world. An example is The
German Ideology manuscripts in Engels's hand which went
unpublished (and unwanted) for many years. The biographer's
audience may be told that the subject's ignorant contemporaries
had no idea what they were missing. The overwhelming impression that readers take away from such narratives is that the subject
is yet another lonely genius adrift in an ungrateful world. This of
course devalues the subject's contemporaries and abstracts the
subject out of any plausible conception of the everyday activities
and circumstances of which a life actually consists.
CHARACTERS AND DRAMATURGY
I decided to confront the reader directly, and initially, with my
subject's continuing, everyday relationships, as all his life he was
a son or brother or uncle or lover or friend to a very large number
of people, relatively few of whom were communists. Bringing
these associates back to life is obviously particularly difficult, as
they exist for us only in letters and memoirs. The letters extant are
almost wholly those written by Engels, rather than by his correspondents, and the memoirs of him that are available were almost
wholly composed within the interpretive tradition that he himself
helped to create.
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Yet there is a cast of supposedly unimportant characters in
Engels's life, as in everyone's. Few biographers are interested in
house-keepers, unmarried sisters, elderly mothers, wholly domestic spouses or partners, and so forth. I decided to bring them
in ahead of the more famous "names" that form a central part of
the narrative tradition, as it was with the non-famous that the
subject's everyday life was lived. Indeed they clearly occupied an
enormous amount of his time. This is not to say that I can find
much of them to recover, but I thought that they should be
resurrected from silence and exhibited to the reader in order to
dramatize the distinction between the subject's "lived" experience and the narrative "life" constructed by a biographer. In the
case of Engels, at least, most of these relatively silent characters
are bound to be women.
Drama plays a very large role in interpretive traditions, in
that some "events" are emphasized-independently
of the space
they occupy in the book-by the biographer, so that the reader can
be apprised of "turning points," or "setbacks" or other cruces in
the "life." The initial Marx-Engels meetings are a case in point,
as Engels' s early life is general! y conceptualized such that his first
meeting with Marx was poignantly "cold." His second meeting,
by dramatic contrast, is presented as the denouement of his
previous activities and the overture to his "real life." Indeed the
fact that these events are portrayed as "Marx-Engels" meetings,
even in biographies of the latter, gives the game away, in that the
focus of most work on Engels is really Marx, not the subject
himself!
I worked hard to make the meetings Engels-Marx meetings; to make Marx a character in Engels' s life; and to keep Marx
from taking over the narrative, as he often threatened to do. At the
same time modern readers naturally relate Engels to Marx, and I
took care in considering their early years to construct detailed
comparisons between Marx's early achievements (actually rather
modest), and Engels 'sown interests and output (far more impressive).
These dramatic moments are of course constructs, often
traceable to memoirists and early biographers; very plausibly the
people involved in these circumstances had little sense at the time
of this "importance." Their actions and reactions within the
narrative drama thus move them into a world-historical realm,
where most readers would like them to be, and where they never
actually were. This again has the effect of determining the
consciousness of individuals, who were once real, and recovering
them to readers today as characters in a prose-drama. Transfer to
the stage and screen is thus but a step away.
8

NARRATIVE PURPOSE
What a biography is actually for should always be an issue for
biographer and reader, and at least in mine I made it so. Worship
or denigration of the subject seems to me to be an insufficient
motive for writing a biography, especially when the order of
service or auto dafe is so relentlessly laid down by predecessors.
Modem theories of structuration take socialization and agency
with equal seriousness, and I was interested to show the reader the
extent to which a supposedly familiar"character" could be reconstructed as a choice-making agent. 6 In my narrative Engels was
someone who experimented with ideas and relationships, a person
who lived out ambiguities of which he was aware, a politician who
retreated from action to writing. Ironically Engels was himself the
author of a deterministic philosophy, and an advocate of highly
willful agency, and thus set the terms, to some extent, for contemporary attempts to resolve this issue theoretically.
Engels's early works reveal the indeterminacy of the
subject's mind and show the "formative" process as contingent on
circumstances quite outside himself/herself and just as indeterminate. Whilst human activity is unlikely to be random in the true
sense, there is certainly an element of unpredictability that must
be presumed, as we each presume it about ourselves and our own
decisions. No one lives life as if determinism were true, and
similarly no one can successfully present themselves as completely unconstrained by the ideas of others, even as interpreted in
their own consciousness. Engels's father, for instance, made
deliberate decisions to constrain his son. These were just the sort
of decisions that one would have expected an industrialist of the
Ruhr to have made at that time. In tum Engels junior, while
constrained physically, financially and emotionally within institutions and assumptions set by others, chose to broaden his
experience in quite contrary ways. My narrative brings out the
indeterminacy and ambiguity of these situations and choices in
ways that make his early years more lively and his later ones more
controversial. But after he was 24 I took him to be somewhat less
of an agent, in that he was demonstrably less experimental, and in
particular he kept himself in circumstances that he did not alter in
fundamental ways.
One of the other themes I chose to explore in my biography
concerned the extent to which writing and politics are coincident
activities, and the extent to which one may preclude the other.
Literary biographers perhaps have a similar problem when confronting works ofliterature which, for the subject, were also ways
9

of making a living in the basest sense. Even where the issue is
raised, the gravity and necessity of the subject's struggles with
quotidian economics often pale before the "world-historical"
contextof"lasting achievement" in which the biographer's narrative is located. The narrative tradition about Engels decrees that
his written words were political acts, and that important political
acts were quite naturally acts of publication, specifically the
publication of works that have "lasted." In the case of Engels
some of those published works could do with a decent burial, and
others should be dusted off since the present situation-in which
I somewhat authoritatively locate myself and my readers-now
differs from the context in which the largely unchanging interpretive tradition was established. These interests supported my
allocation of one-half of the narrative space-time to hitherto littleregarded early works.
My investigation of the situation surrounding Engels's
early works exposed the extent to which the subject engaged in
political activities that were not themselves the business of writing and publishing major works. This produced in my narrative
as a whole something like the hallowed "formative" pattern of
development-but in reverse. That is, the subject successively
withdrew from various activities as chronological time went on.
As Engels's career proceeded he lost skills and interests, such as
speech-making to the public and party-political organizing amongst
workers. In his early days of"practical" activity he had upbraided
his principal collaborator Marx for undue bookishness, inopportune reluctance to engage with real workers, and neglect of dayto-day politics. Later he dropped this line of criticism as it would
have applied all too clearly to himself, and indeed he dropped all
lines of criticism of Marx, as he had hitched his own career to
Marx's in no uncertain terms.
NARRATIVE AND EXPERIENCE
My organization of narrative time in traduces a further element of
"lived experience" into biography, in that perceived time when we
face new circumstances slows down, and conversely routinized
events flow swiftly. This perspective is delineated in The Magic
Mountain, as Hans Castorp's arrival and early encounters at the
sanatorium are supposedly experienced more slowly by the character himself, than events taking place later when the situation is
more familiar. 7 The narrative space presented in tactile form to the
reader reflects this "lived experience" rather than strictly equal
units of chronology. I judged the later years of my subject to be
somewhat routine, and so cut down the narrative space that they
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occupied. This of course telescopes chronological time, and treats
the sheer amount of "material" that remains from that period in a
highly selective manner. The reader is warned of this and is
referred to a literature that exists outside the biography itself,
particularly to my own works, as I declined to reproduce them to
make the present biography "comprehensive." 8
My own narrative, moreover, is methodologically discontinuous, and critics will probably take this to be further evidence
of an unwanted authorial intrusion into the traditional way that
narrative and time interact in biography. I treated my subject's
early years (up to age 24) in a narrative that combined thematic
and chronological exposition. For his ''life" in maturity I adopted
a technique of "inverse nesting." Most biographies of figures
similar to mine prioritize their intellectual life, and introduce their
politics and personal quirks as the narrative proceeds, in order to
provide useful motives for the subject and light relief for the
reader. By contrast I chose to survey the mature years of the
subject's "personal" life from 24 through 75 in a central chapter.
(I confess I could not kill him off by mentioning the word "death"
mid-way through the book.) Successive chapters on his political
activities, including a convenient clutch of "minor writings," and
on his intellectual "major writings," bring the narrative to the
point of conclusion. In that way the personal and political
"performative contexts" of his "thought" are set out in advance by
me. 9
As I deal with Engels's "thought" I confront the reader
with a highly critical evaluation. These mature works of philosophy and social science are themselves readily accessible, so I did
not reproduce them in extenso. This will no doubt annoy those
who wish to be saved the trouble of reading the works complete
or making their own abridgements. Moreover I did not reproduce
critical material of my own that is published elsewhere for the
same reason. The last chapter is thus somewhat breathless.
Yet for me Engels's "enduring legacy" no longer necessarily lies in those works, but elsewhere, particularly in his early
revolutionary consritutionalism, his essays into party politics and
his concern with the causes and consequences of economic
stratification in industrial societies. I hope that some readers
might be at least a little grateful for sparing them extended
discussions of Anti-Duhring and Dialectics of Nature. Those
works were his toricall y important in the decades following Engels' s
death, and this is not to be denied . However, I take it that "what
is important for us" about Engels can itself be reinterpreted,
because who "we" are and what "important" means, can be
expected to change over time, perhaps very profoundly.
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NARRATIVE TRADITION
No matter how resolutely the subject's reputation is inscribed in
the narrative tradition for certain "great" works or "significant"
acts or "influential" thoughts, there is always the possibility of a
radical reassessment. Indeed I would suggest that received
interpretive traditions should be changed for the sake of it. As
biographers are necessarily different people, and as their situations are inevitably different, there is little point in successive
biographers reproducing the same biography. In a shon story
Jorge Luis Borges invents an author who rewrites certain chapters
of Don Quixote exactly matching the text of Cervantes, not from
an imaginative recreation of the sixteenth century, but from
twentieth-century experience itself. Borges presumes that this
exercise would require an immense exercise of concentration and
intellect. 10 Actually I think that a number of biographers and
commentators manage this kind of feat with relatively little
difficulty.
From our present perspective we are entitled to pick over
the past, including past lives. These exercises in the "genealogy"
of the present and the "archaeology" of the past must necessarily
differ, depending on authorial inclination. 11 I was rather lucky in
uneanhing Engels the revolutionary constitutionalist just before a
massive wave of revolutionary constitutionalism. The fact that
his influence as a revolutionary constitutionalist was circumscribed within his own lifetime does not argue against examining
his politics as an exemplar. In that way we look more closely at
the "genealogy" of modern democracy, and we gain an "archaeological" distance from its current forms. By looking behind our
present political context, and by stepping outside it, we perceive
options for the future.
An unexamined present necessarily yields a future that is
more of the same. Narrative traditions are among the nightmares
that weigh on the brain of the living, as Marx commented in The
EighteenthBrumaire of Louis Napoleon. 12 In my view biography
too often succumbs to rigor mortis, and it is up to biographers to
work harder to make it live. Biographers could inspire a critical
assessment of almost any issue, as any reasonable recovery of a
life would raise matters of contemporary importance. This can be
done in ways that merely reinforce received "truths" that are
amongst the most efficacious props of current power structures.
Or it can be done in ways that challenge these structures by
questioning traditional conceptualizations. Biography is not a
window on the past, but a political act in the present.
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